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CASE COMMENTS
be confronted by the private litigant with matters that were not liti-
gated by the Government and, because of the passage of perhaps 10
to 15 years the defendant may find it impossible to obtain evidence
to defend against the claim. Also, since under Leh the statute is prob-
ably tolled even against defendants not named in the Government
suit, some defendants in private suits may be faced with a wholly
unanticipated suit with all of the resultant evidence-acquisition prob-
lems, years after the occurrence of the matters complained of.
A much more just and less confusing procedure would be for the
private plaintiff to file a timely claim, then have a right to continuance
until the Government suit has been completed. This procedure would
still enable the private litigant to make full use of the Government suit,
but would be more equitable, since defendants would have notice of
the pending suit against them and could within the time which the
statute of limitations indicates is the outermost limit of fairness begin
obtaining evidence.
HOWARD J. Bacx, JR.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION UPON
MANDATORY RETIREMENT
The purpose of unemployment compensation is to provide for the
systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment from
which temporary benefits may be paid during periods of unemploy-
ment. Unemployment compensation thus helps the employee to obtain
another job by temporarily maintaining his purchasing power. With
this assistance a claimant can remain in the labor market until he
finds work comparable to his previous job.1 The unemployment
compensation system is tied into a nationwide system of publicly
run employment offices which help to reduce the volume of unem-
ployment.2
'Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.02 (1952).
2The Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 49-49(l) establishes the United States
Employment Service. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (Supp. 1966) provides for a maximum
tax on the employer of 3.13% of each covered employee's total wages, as
defined in 26 U.S.CA. § 3306(b), as the means of financing this service. Various
credits are available to employers to reduce this tax liability, among them the
allowance of a credit of up to 90% of the tax otherwise due. The employer
must thus pay at least 10% of the tax (.31% of the taxable wages), and this
amount is used to defray the administrative expenses of the entire system.
26 U.S.CA. § 3302. Each state unemployment compensation system receives
necessary appropriations from the .31% and the remaining amount is paid into the
individual state benefit fund.
To qualify for appropriations a state unemployment compensation agency
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Eligibility for unemployment compensation requires that the claim-
ant be unemployed through other than his own fault or design, that
he be capable of work, and that he be actively seeking suitable em-
ployment. If such a claimant is unable to obtain employment and the
required waiting period, usually a week, has elapsed since his applica-
tion for unemployment compensation, he is entitled to receive mone-
tary benefits. Of course, a claimant cannot refuse to accept an offer of
suitable work without good cause and still receive monetary benefits.
Unemployment compensation is available to the claimant only for
a limited period after termination of his previous employment3 and
may not be waived or assigned and is exempt from execution and
attachment by creditors.4 Since unemployment compensation is pre-
mised upon the employee's leaving his employment through some
fault of his employer,5 it is paid to a claimant entirely from money
must be vested with all powers necessary to cooperate with the United States
Employment Service and to adopt certain provisions of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 49(c), certified by the Secretary of Labor as conforming to the Act. 26
U.S.C.A. § 3304. Individual state acts provide that an application for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits is also an application for suitable employment, and
the state agencies serve as job clearing houses for employer and employee.
3Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.04(4) (1952); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.30 (Baldwin
1964).
4 No agreement by an employee to waive his right to benefits is valid, nor
shall benefits be assigned, released, or commuted. Such benefits are exempt
from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, garnishment, attach-
ment, and all other process or remedy for recovery or collection of a debt,
which exemption may not be waived. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.32
(Baldwin 1964). See also Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.16 (1952).
SThe dismissal of an employee pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement has been held a voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to
the employer; thus the employee is not within the statutory terms under which
unemployment compensation is payable. For example:
(a) refusal to join labor organizations with which the employer had a
closed or union-shop agreement, In Re Malaspina, 285 App. Div. 564, 139
N.Y.S.2d 521 (1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 413, 131 NE.2d 709 (1956);
(b) refsual to pay union dues and thus remain in good standing with the
union as required under the contract, O'Donnell v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd., 173 Pa. Super. 263, 98 A.2d 406 (1953);
(c) marriage, after which the contract requires discharge, Means v. Unem-
ployment Comp. Bd., 177 Pa. Super. 410, 110 A.2d 886 (1955);
(d) pregnancy, requiring discharge under terms of the contract, Rzepski v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd., 182 Pa. Super. 16, 124 A.2d 651 (1956);
(e) refusal of a contract-permitted transfer or downgrading which involves
lower pay or less favorable hours (with retention of seniority), In re
Gerdano, 2 App. Div. 2d 88, 153 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1956); Roberts v. Chain
Belt Co., 2 Wis. 2d 399, 86 N.W.2d 406 (1957). See Annor, 90 A.L.R.2d
835 (1963) where "termination of employment as a result of union action or
pursuant to union contract as 'voluntary' for purposes of unemployment
compensation benefits" is dealt with.
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the discharging employer has paid into a general fund.e The con-
tribution rates for the employer are therefore based upon his past
experience in causing employees to be eligible for benefits1
The requirement of employer-fault raises the question whether an
employee who, pursuant to his employment contract, is mandatorily
retired with a pension paid in part or exclusively by his employer may
also receive unemployment compensation. It is probable that in the
negotiation of such an employment contract, frequently a collective
bargaining agreement, a claim for unemployment compensation upon
mandatory retirement is not contemplated by either party. Payment
of both the pension and unemployment compensation introduces a
double financial burden upon the employer. Nonpayment of un-
employment compensation introduces the possibility of a mandatorily
retired employee's loss of his anticipated right to unemployment
compensation with the consequential hardship of being placed at a
disadvantage in the search for employment. Equitable resolution of
this problem requires considering the interaction of unemployment
compensation, pensions, social security, and the welfare role of the state
and federal governments.
In determining whether such an employee may receive both benefits,
courts have reached opposite conclusions. FloridaO has held that
the mandatorily retired employee who, pursuant to his employment
contract, is receiving a pension may also receive unemployment com-
pensation; but Ohio9 has reached the opposite result.
Marcum v. Ohio Match Co.10 denied unemployment compensation
to an employee retired pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
providing for a pension upon mandatory retirement. To deny the
claimant compensation, the court had to find, in the words of the
applicable statute, that the claimant had "quit his work without just
cause or . . .been discharged for just cause in connection with his
work. . ... 11 Marcum, in upholding the result reached by the Ohio
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, differed with the Bureau's
6"[C]ontributions become due and shall be paid by each employer to the
bureau of unemployment compensation for the unemployment compensation fund
in accordance with such regulations as the administrator of the bureau of un-
employment compensation prescribes, and shall not be deducted, in whole or in
part, from the remuneration of individuals in his employ." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4141.23 (Baldwin 1964); See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.08 (1952).
7Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.08(3) (1952).
sSt. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, 180 So. 2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965).
9Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 95, 212 NZE.2d 425 (1965).
lOlbid.
"Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29(D) (2) (a) (Baldwin 1964).
1966]
366 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
holding that this was a quit without cause12 and held that the em-
ployee's mandatory retirement was a discharge for just cause in
connection with his work.'3 The court used claimant's compulsory
union membership and consequent representation by the bargaining
agent as a novel basis for holding that acceptance of a pension as a
benefit of the employment contract required acceptance of mandatory
retirement as a burden of the contract. The court therefore held that
mandatory retirement is a discharge for just cause.14
From the employer's viewpoint, this result is satisfactory since
it leaves him with only the burden of the pension which he had
contracted to bear. Since unemployment compensation is not due,
the employer does not bear the additional burden of a rise in unemploy-
ment compensation rates. From the employee's viewpoint, this decision
is inequitable and violates the spirit of unemployment compensation to
the extent that pension payments are less than unemployment com-
pensation benefits. To the extent of this deficit, the employee is de-
prived of the opportunity to compete in the labor market on a rela-
tively equal footing with other unemployed workers.1 There is
little reason to exclude a covered employee from unemployment
compensation solely on the ground that he is old'0 or that his employ-
ment contract implies that he wishes to be retired when actually
he is an able worker who desires to continue his employment.' 7 To
hold that a mandatory retirement is a voluntary leaving can be done
only by holding that the making of the contract of employment pro-
viding for mandatory retirement is itself voluntary. However, this
12Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., supra note 9, at 426.
131d. at 427-28.
1l4bid. The statutory reduction in unemployment compensation benefits in
the event that retirement pay is received, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 4141.31
(Baldwin 1964), was not construed by the court as implying a right to unem-
ployment benefits when retirement pay is received. The court further held
that there was no statute-violating waiver of benefits. "Before one can waive
benefits under a statute, it must first be determined that one is entitled to those
rights." Id. at 427.
'0 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.02 (1952).
16Age may be "just cause" for dismissal if one is incapacitated by age. That
view leaves to relief the problem of the superannuated employee who is attempt-
ing to find work which he is still able to perform.
'1 The failure of the claimant to find employment is presumed to arise either
from claimant's age or the fact that his union which had contracted for his
retirement pervaded the field, thus tending automatically excluding him from fu-
ture work. It is possible that the claimant knew he could not get future employ-
ment and was applying only to receive unemployment compensation. However, to
assume this would impute a dishonest intent to the claimant and not allow a
rational investigation of the problem.
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holding is not valid because the real choice of an employee when
faced with such a contract is not whether he wishes to comply with
the retirement provision but whether he prefers to work under such
terms or not at all. That is a Hobson's choice.
The Florida decision in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux8 permitted
the former employee mandatorily retired by the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to receive unemployment compensation in addi-
tion to his pension. It is interesting to note that although St. Joe Paper
Co. concluded that "an unemployment compensation statute is remedial
and is to be liberally construed to effect its beneficent purpose, and
that the disqualifying provisions therein are to be narrowly con-
strued," 19 the court may have been forced into its result by the word-
ing of the Florida statute. To have reached the opposite result and
denied unemployment compensation, St. Joe Paper Co. would have had
to hold that mandatory retirement was a quit without just cause or a
discharge for misconduct in connection with the claimant's work.20
It is difficult to rationalize how mandatory retirement could be put
under either of these categories. The court, "in the interest of relieving
the economic insecurity of a person unemployed through no fault
of his own . . . [and] in order to attain the Legislature's goal of
lightening the burden of unemployment. ," 21 held that the claim-
ant had not voluntarily left his employment.22 Legislative intent for
this result was also derived from other Florida statutes which make
a waiver of any right of unemployment compensation void23 and from
statutes guaranteeing that employees have the right of self-organiza-
tion.24 But, in accordance with a Florida Industrial Commission policy,
18180 So. 2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965).
'Dld. at 674.
2 0Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.06 (1) (1952).
21St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, supra note 18, at 671.
22lbid.
23FIa. Star. Ann. § 443.16 (1) (1952) provides in part:
"Any agreement by an individual to waive, release, or commute his rights to
benefits or any other rights under this chapter shall be void."
Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.32 (Baldwin 1964), which was dismissed by
Marcum as inapplicable. Marcum v. Ohio Match Co., supra note 9, at 427.
24Fla. Stat. Ann. § 447.03 (1952):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
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the holding was limited to cases in which the claimant's weekly pension
payments are less than the weekly unemployment compensation.2 5
In Marcum, on the other hand, the court had different statutory
language to interpret. Only with considerable difficulty could man-
datory retirement be called a "quit without just cause," but it could,
without doing violence to the language involved, be called a "dis-
charge for just cause in connection with . .. [claimant's] work." 26
Thus the variance in the 2 holdings may have resulted from the
fact that Marcum found the "discharge for just cause" phrase of the
Ohio statute could reasonably be interpreted to permit discharge of an
employee pursuant to a mandatory retirement agreement or discharge
because one has reached a certain age.
St. Joe Paper Co. required benefits to be paid to the claimant only
if weekly pension payments are less than weekly unemployment com-
pensation. A decision that both pension and unemployment compensa-
tion were fully payable would have imposed upon the employer possi-
ble double liability 21 for the amount of the unemployment compensa-
tion. The employer would thus have been misled by his reliance upon
the unemployment contract with the employee or representative of the
employee. Such an unexpected financial burden would place the em-
ployer at a disadvantage compared to competitors who do not have
pension plans in effect or with competitors in other jurisdictions
where only a single liability is imposed.
In any attempt to solve this problem, one must consider the entire
scope of social legislation. If it is decided that an employee retired
under a mandatory retirement agreement which includes a pension at
least equal to the benefits under unemployment compensation is
25In St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, supra note 18, at 670, the court refers to
Rule 185U-2.07 of the Florida Industrial Commission:
[WIhere an employee is retired-pursuant to the terms of a retirement
plan financed in whole or in part by the employer, under which he had
no option to continue in his employment, he shall be disqualified for
unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that he has voluntarily
left his employment without good cause attributable to the employer "only
if the Commission finds" that the payments to the employee under the
plan, when. pro-rated by weeks, "equal or exceed the maximum weekly
benefit amount allowable under the Florida Unemployment Compensation
Law."
260Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29 (Baldwin 1964).
2 7 St. Joe Paper Co. v. Gautreaux, supra note 18, at 674 recognizes this inequity,
stating that to allow the claimant to receive unemployment benefits "would
penalize the employer who has instituted a pension plan for his employees, as
compared to an employer who has not, for the former would be required to bear
the double financial burden of contributing to both the pension plan and the
unemployment compensation fund:'
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eligible for benefits which would raise his income above the level of
unemployment compensation, it must then be decided who is to pay for
such compensation. The employer is wholly responsible for unemploy-
ment compensation 2s and for the pension he contracted to provide
the employee. Moreover, the employee will probably be receiving
social security to which the employee and all his employers combined
have contributed equally.29 The employee who collects a pension,
unemployment compensation, and social security places a tre-
mendous financial burden upon the employer. The excess of the
pension, social security, and unemployment compensation combined
over unemployment compensation alone might then be said to be a
welfare payment made largely by the retirement employer. That
employer would thus bear a burden which has traditionally been
spread throughout the entire population by means of a general tax.
If the net sum3O of weekly social security and pension payments at
least equals the weekly unemployment compensation benefits, which
is the legislative determination of the income necessary to allow one to
stay in the labor market, the purpose of unemployment compensation
is accomplished without resort to unemployment compensation itself.
When the pension income is less than the unemployment compensa-
tion, the employer should be liable for the net difference between the
pension and the unemployment compensation otherwise due. If, as in
Marcum, the employer is not to be liable for that difference, a possible
solution is to hold the union liable since the union has a duty to repre-
sent adequately all employees for which it is the collective bargaining
agent. The liability of the union could be based upon a theory of in-
adequate representation of the employee. A union fund to cover the
difference could be financed from union dues and the retired employee
would thus be enabled to search for another job without undue
economic hardship.
Another possible solution would be a statute requiring that a contract
28Fla. Star. Ann. § 443.08 (1952); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.23 (Baldwin
1964).291nt. Rev. Code of 1954 § 3111; Int. Rev. Code of 1954 S 3101.
30Neither unemployment compensation nor Social Security payments is taxable.
IT 3230, 1938-2 Cum. Bull. 136-37; 3 P-H 1966 Fed. Tax Serv. 7032(5); IT
3447, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 191. However, by virtue of Int. Rev. Code of 1954
§ 106, all of a pension paid wholly from employer contributions, none of which
contributions was considered taxable income of the employee when made, is,
when received, taxable income of the employee. Thus the net amount a retired
employee receives when a pension is a substitute for any portion of unemploy-
ment compensation may be less than if full unemployment compensation is re-
ceived. The net difference would usually be small, but small amounts of money
can be significant at the income levels typically involved here.
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